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LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO OHIO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN 1959
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.*
Workmen's Compensation legislation in 1959 was marked by a
very spirited struggle-in committee hearings, on the legislative floors
and through the lobbies of the capital city. The original package-House
Bill 470--contained revolutionary provisions, much more drastic in
alterations than the 1955 amendments which were acknowledged to be
the greatest change since 1925.1 The final enactment appeared as Sub-
stitute House Bill 470, effective November 2, 1959. This bill deleted
major portions of the original H. B. 470 and included numerous other
House Bills introduced during the 103rd General Assembly.2 The result
was a final package with certain major but not revolutionary amend-
ments in the indicated sections of the Ohio Revised Code.
Definitions:
Section 4123.01
Who is an employer and an employee? Traditionally employers of
less than three employees have not been compelled to participate in work-
men's compensation. Now if there be a written agreement between em-
ployer and employees which binds the employer to pay into the state in-
surance fund the employer is legally obligated to do so even if less than
three employees are involved. Also included as employees are elected mem-
bers of the state, county, municipal or township governments and boards
of education.
What is an injury? For nearly fifty years Ohio has used this term in
trying to identify what situations are compensable. It would appear that
what is meant by injury should be well known. The constitutional au-
thority uses the word "injuries." 3 The Ohio legislature has provided from
the first act compensation to "every employee . . . who is injured."' The
*Professor of Law, Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Western Reserve
University, and Chairman, Ohio Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council.
1 De Leone and Alloway, The Newu Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law,
16 OHIO ST. L. J. 515 (1956).
2 House Bills: 130 (radiation injury), 176 (defining "injury"), 431 (extended
to elected officials), 472 (extended to Ohio National Guard), 513 (hospitals in-
cluded as employer), 885 (certificate of payment of premiums), 966 (employers
liability for contribution from independent contractors), 967 (statement of pay-
ment of premiums), 1050 (insurance for payment), 1062 (premium payments by
employer), 1063 (costs of administration), 1110 and 1111 (Bureau of Workmen's
Compensation powers against employers) ; Senate Bills: 82 (increase for disabled
workmen), 224. (extended to Ohio National Guard), 243 (replacement of injured
artificial appliances).
3 OHIO CoNsT. art. II, § 35.
4 103 OHIO LAws 79 (March 14, 1913) sec. 21. The prior act before the 1912
constitutional enabling provision provided similar language: "to such employees
. . . that have been injured." 102 OHIO LAws 529 (June 15, 1911) Sec. 21.
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Supreme Court of Ohio in interpreting the meaning of injury, however,
established early the necessity of an accidental injury before an injury was
compensable. 5 The court in these early cases was confronted, it must be
remembered, by the attempt to include occupational diseases and hazards
within the framework of compensability. The first statutes did not include
these disabilities and the court used "accidental" to emphasize the type of
injury intended to be covered. After the enactment of the occupational
disease coverage other cases arose involving not diseases but stresses, strains
and pressures which disabled workmen. A night watchman found an
unlocked door, called the police, aided in the building search then returned
to his seat feeling sick from the excitement. Illness from such excitement
was not physical injury protected by the compensation law.6 A worker,
pouring hot liquid from a ladle, as he had done for seven years, injured
and paralyzed his hand nerves and tendons from the candle's heat and
hard pressure, was denied compensation. 7 Trauma was not evident and
no sudden happening or accident occurred, so compensation was denied.
The General Assembly in 1937 attempted to define injury: "The
term injury as used in this section and in the workmen's compensation
act shall include any injury received in the course of, and arising out of,
the injured employee's employment."'
The Supreme Court cases which followed this legislative definition
continued -to interpret injury as a physical, traumatic injury, accidental in
character, however. A worker who suffered a strangulated hernia and
death when his wrench slipped while tightening bolts on an auto frame
was not covered by compensation benefits.9 Claims arising from stresses
and strains which caused cardio-vascular disabilities were disallowed be-
cause the incidents were not accidental in origin or cause, hence they were
not injuries.'0 Back disabilities caused by -heavy lifting met a similar fate."
In 1942, however, the Supreme Court introduced a new line of cases
with a different philosophy and interpretation of injury. A worker pour-
ing metal in a foundry with 1130 heat collapsed on the job and died
twelve hours later from heat prostration. Compensation benefits were
granted. The court majority of four reasoned in Malone v. Industrial
Commission'2 that the 1937 amendment defining injury as "any injury"
meant that injury should include accidental injuries not only in cause and
5 Renkel v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834 (1923);
Industrial Commission v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 110 N.E. 744 (1915).
6 Industrial Commission v. O'Malley, 124 Ohio St. 401, 178 N.E. 842 (1931).
7 Industrial Commission v. Lambert, 126 Ohio St. 501, 186 N.E. 89 (1933).
8117 OHIo LAws 109 (April 9, 1937).
9 Gwaltney v. General Motors, 137 Ohio St. 354, 30 N.E.2d 342 (1940).
1o Cordray v. Industrial Commission, 139 Ohio St. 173, 38 N.E. 2d 1017 (1942);
Vogt v. Industrial Commission, 138 Ohio St. 233, 34 N.E. 2d 197 (1941).
11 Matczak v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 139 Ohio St. 181, 38 N.E.2d
1021 (1942).
12 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942).
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character but also in result. A physically traumatic injury had occurred
here because of the sudden, violent attack on the body tissues by an ab-
normal condition which was unusual, unexpected and the result of em-
ployment. Two judges concurred on the basis that the only question was
whether the injury was caused by trauma or disease. Since it was a
traumatic experience, compensation coverage was permissible. A later
worker suffering a strained back with hematoma resulting in death was
also within the area of compensability. The court urged that since the
1937 amendment, an injury need not be accidental."3 Furthermore, when
the incident involved a bus driver who operated his crowded vehicle on a
foggy night under severe strain and who suffered a coronary thrombosis
and died, the Ohio judiciary after four decisions and opinions ruled that
the death could be compensable.14 But if a worker suffered a cerebral
hemorrhage and partial paralysis after an employment experience of severe
worry and anxiety, the Supreme Court later held an injury did not occur
within the terms of the act for no physical exertion had transpired."3
The Supreme Court following the 1937 amendment on injury, and
especially after the Malone" case in 1942, appeared to be riding two
horses simultaneously-an interesting demonstration but one not cal-
culated to bring certainty and understanding to the law.
In 1956, opportunity presented itself to clarify the injury definition.
The now classic Dripps"7 case arrived at the doors of the Supreme Court.
A worker who was a swing line man on a boom, which had been un-
balanced for nine weeks prior, used a greater pull on the line. A sudden,
electric-like shock struck him from shoulders to fingers while he was
exerting this extra pull. He was disabled. A majority of three judges held
the incident not compensable-injury comprehends a physical or trau-
matic damage or harm accidental in character, a sudden, unexpected
chance mishap. Mere effort and strain in themselves were not enough.
Two judges dissented contending that injury includes events accidental
in character and result as well as means. Two other judges concurred
with the majority that an accidental injury was demanded for compen-
'3Maynard v. Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company, 144 Ohio St. 22, 56
N.E.2d 195 (1944)).
14 McNees v. Cincinnati Street Railway, 80 N.E.2d 498 (C. P. Hamilton,
1948) (compensable for physical injury means any injury); aff'd (2-1) 84
Ohio App. 499, 87 N.E.2d 819 (1949); rev'd and remanded (4-2) 152 Ohio
St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1950) ; 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951) (mental
strain or worry can be an injury under Workmen's Compensation but it is a
jury question).
15 Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953), (a lone
dissenter contended unusual exertion due to emotions was an injury for compensa-
tion).
16 Op. cit. supra note 12.
17 Dripps v. Industrial Commission, 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956).
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sation, but they urged specific overruling of the Malone and Maynard
cases to eliminate the confusion.'
8
As late as February 4, 1959, the Ohio Supreme Court still displayed
disagreement over this definition of injury. In Davis v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company,"'a rubber worker, while pushing on a tire stuck
to the drum, exerted added pressure and suffered a back injury aggravat-
ing a pre-existing back condition. On the authority of the Dripps case, the
per curiam opinion held no injury was present so no compensation could
be granted. All four judges who supported this opinion joined in a con-
curring opinion which admitted "two irreconcilable lines of decision" and
urged that "if this court was wrong in its interpretation of the statute
as announced in the Dripps case and those which have followed it, and
if the workmen's compensation act is to be made a general policy of in-
surance for the employees of Ohio, as has been argued to this court on
occasion, our error should be corrected by the General Assembly and a
different approach to workmen's compensation outlined in clear and un-
equivocal legislative expression." 2 The three dissenting judges contended
that the 1937 amendment indicated clear legislative expression upholding
the Malone and Maynard decisions and where Dripps conflicted it should
be overruled--one horse not two should be ridden on the definition of
injury.
One week after the Davis decision was announced, the Workmen's
Compensation Advisory Council submitted its third annual report to the
General Assembly and the Governor. A majority of the Council recom-
mended a definition of injury which adopted the Malone concept and re-
jected Dripps.2 '
Meanwhile H. B. 470 had been introduced with the following
definition of injury:
"Injury shall mean any disability or harmful bodily change,
traumatic or otherwise in origin or result, received in the course
of, and arising out of the injured employee's employment. It
shall include the occurrence or aggravation of any disability
through the use of any exertion or being subjected to any strain.
To constitute an injury it shall not be necessary that there be
some sudden, unusual and unexpected occurrence or some
sudden specific mishap or event, or accidental means."
In H. B. 176 introduced by Mr. Cloud (Republican minority
leader) another definition of injury was suggested:
" 'Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received
18 Op. cit. supra notes 12 and 13.
19 168 Ohio St. 482, 155 N.E.2d 889 (1959).
20 168 Ohio St. 482, 484-485, 155 N.E.2d 889, 890-891 (1959).
21 Third Report, Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council, State of Ohio
(February 11, 1959) Part III.
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in the course of, arising out of, the injured employee's em-
ployment."
The Cloud definition was incorporated into Substitute H. B. 470
and now becomes the definition of injury to guide the bureau, commis-
sion and courts of Ohio. In substance it represents Judge Zimmerman's
definition in the Dripps' dissenting opinion.
On the hard anvil of practical cases the decision makers will now
shape what is an injury. The 1959 General Assembly has provided a new
pattern. Unusual stress and strain, physical or mental, directly caused by
the employment experience will now be important actors.
An entirely new definition was also added this year. " 'Compensa-
tion' includes, but is not limited to, the payment of or furnishing of bene-
fits." And "benefits" include money paid, hospital, medical or nursing
services, medicine, therapeutic or orthopedic devices and other services,
items, proprietaries, or devices occasioned by reason of the injury or
occupational disease.
Indirectly, this new definition liberalizes the statutes of limitations.
Prior to this addition furnishing a benefit did not stay the statute but pay-
ing compensation did. Now furnishing the benefit will have the same
effect as paying compensation. The ten year continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission extends from the last furnishing of a benefit.
Ohio Organized Militia:
Sections 4123.021 - .024
A member of the militia on full time active duty is now within
state employment for the purposes of workmen's compensation and quali-
fies for maximum benefits provided employees.
Reporting of Injuries and Occupational Diseases:
Section 4123.28
Occupational diseases are now included along with injuries and
deaths on which employers must keep records and report to the com-
mission within a week. More important, a copy must be furnished the in-
terested employee or his dependents.
Handicapped Employees:
Section 4123.343
The section on employment of handicapped workers has been strength-
ened by the legislative directive to construe the provisions "liberally to
the end that employers shall be encouraged to employ and retain in their
employment handicapped workers."
Liability for Subcontractors:
Section 4123.35
On recommendation of the Administrator and Advisory Council the
1959 enactment extended liability to an employer for unpaid premiums
due from the employer's subcontractor with respect to that part of the
subcontractor's payroll which is work performed pursuant to a contract
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with the employer. This will aid in preventing the escape of irresponsible
subcontracting employers. The primary employer is stimulated to assure
himself that his subcontractors are within the state insurance program.
Collecting Premiums from Non-Complying Employers:
Section 4123.37
This section was completely redrafted. In substance there is not a ma-
jor change, however. The purpose is to provide an automatic assessment and
judgment at the hands of the Administrator to enforce collection promptly
of a delinquent premium payment. The procedure is similar to the one
used in sales tax claims.2 2 Since the information for the basis of a claim
for premium payment is in the employer's control, this change will per-
mit enforcement to follow more closely the defaulting employer. This
amendment, too, was recommended by the Administrator and the Ad-
visory Council.
Disabled Workmen's Relief Fund:
Section 4123.412 - .414
Since workmen's compensation is predicated on an insurance founda-
tion, employers pay premiums into an insurance fund. The premiums
are fixed at a rate which reflects the benefits schedule in effect for the
year the premiums are due. The year in which an injury or disease occurs
then fixes the benefits due the disabled worker. In the early years of com-
pensation the weekly payments to a permanently, totally disabled worker
were as low as $12.00. Numerous disabled workers whose compensation
benefits were fixed at the time of injury are paid at rates considerably
below current weekly benefits in compensation. Rising living costs since
World War II have made these low weekly payments completely un-
realistic for living maintenance. The state insurance fund, however,
cannot be tapped for extra payments. It is a "trust fund for the benefits of
employer and employees" based on premiums determined on benefits in ef-
fect in the year the premium is paid.23 To provide more money for realistic
living maintenance the General Assembly in 1953 enacted the Disabled
Workers Relief program. Permanently, totally disabled workers were to re-
ceive $25.00 weekly. The costs of the difference between what they were
paid from the compensation fund and $25.00 was to be met from the gen-
eral revenue fund of the state. This year the amount to be paid each dis-
abled worker weekly is increased to an amount equal to the difference be-
tween what he receives from compensation and $40.25. More important,
the general revenue fund is not obligated to pay this large sum but rather
a new payroll tax of 30 per $100.00 gross payroll will be assessed on em-
ployers amenable to the workmen's compensation law. The first assess-
ment will be made January 1, 1960, on payrolls from August 1, 1959,
to January 6, 1960. Thereafter annual assessment on annual payrolls
22 OHIo REv. CODE § 5739.13 (Supp. 1955).
23 OHIo REV. CODE § 4123.30.
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will be made on January 1.24 In the event this tax is insufficient in amount,
$3,000,000 has been designated from the general revenue fund to make
up the difference.
Failure to Comply with Premium Payments:
Section 4123.50
Another Administrator and Advisory Council recommendation
which was enacted permits all fines levied against officers of employer
firms or corporations, for failure to cause the firm or corporation to com-
ply in paying premiums, to be paid into the general fund of the political
subdivision where the case is prosecuted.
Appeals to Court of Common Pleas:
Section 4123.519
Under the new provisions a claimant may go directly to the com-
mon pleas court from a decision of the Administrator on reconsideration
or from a decision of the Regional Board. Only two steps, therefore,
need be taken at the administrative level before a judicial determination.
The claimant must also file a petition "setting forth the issues" within
thirty days after a notice of appeal has been filed with the commission and
the court regardless of whether it is an appeal by the claimant or the
employer.
A deposition of a physician may be taken by either claimant or em-
ployer and filed in the court. If done, the physician need not respond to a
subpoena. Of course the physician may do so voluntarily. Deposition costs
are paid by the commission from the surplus fund. If the claimant prevails
in court, costs are charged to the unsuccessful party be it the commission
or self-insuring employer.
The cost of "any legal proceedings authorized by this section, in-
cluding an attorney's fee to the claimant's attorney to be fixed by the
trial judge in event the claimant's right to participate in the fund is
established upon the final determination of an appeal" is charged against
the employer if he contested the appeal or against the commission if it or
the administrator contested the appeal. This provision was long needed.
To pay attorney's fees from the compensation .benefits as a percentage of
money recovered for claimant smacks of the traditional common law tort
personal injury case. It violates completely the basic philosophy of work-
men's compensation by reducing substantially the compensation received
by the injured worker or the deceased worker's dependent.
A further provision limits attorney's fees to a maximum: 20% on the
first $3,000 of an award, 10% of the award in excess of $3,000, with
a maximum fee of $750. The express provisions of this paragraph em-
phasize the maximum an attorney can collect for all court procedures-
trial and appeal-as $750 with the trial judge making the precise de-
termination.
2 4 Amend. Senate Bill 472 (103rd General Assembly).
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In fact, the Supreme Court in an early case held that by private
contract claimant and attorney could not provide for a fee over and
above the statutory maximum. Furthermore, private contingent fee con-
tracts for a certain percentage of the commission's award were against
public policy and void. The strong words of the opinion indicated also that
the statutory maximum applied not only to representation in the judicial
trial and appeal but also prior representation before the administrative
bodies.2 5
A new section added in 1959 indirectly underscores this direct fee
limitation. The entire act "shall be liberally construed in favor of em-
ployees and the dependents of deceased employees." (Sec. 4123.95). To
permit additional attorneys' fees based on a contingent fee contract for
representation at the administrative level to be taken from compensation
benefits would appear to violate this legislative mandate.26
When an employer appeals an award by the commission, payment of
compensation for subsequent periods of total disability shall not be stayed
pending the appeal. Prior to 1959 only payments of the award being ap-
pealed were not stayed.
New language has also been inserted to place all actions under this
section at the top of the civil calendar in both common pleas and appel-
late courts except for election causes. The judiciary, faced with imposing
case backlogs, has been reluctant to favor compensation appeals. Under
Sec. 4121.29 a similar priority is given except that causes affecting the
public utilities commission and election causes are both given precedence
over compensation actions. That earlier section also permits the commis-
sion's attorney to request compensation preference when he is permitted
to intervene. Whether this new legislative instruction will be any more
influential with the judiciary than the earlier one remains to be seen.
The new appeals provisions apply to cases in the administrative level
on the effective date of the act; while cases pending in courts on Novem-
ber 2, 1959, will be governed by the new amendments on that day.
Written Notices:
Section 4123.522
Employee, employer and their respective representatives will now be
entitled to written notices of hearings, determinations, orders, awards or
decisions. The person failing -to receive notice without fault on his part
has twenty days after receiving notice to take the action afforded by the
notice.
2 5 Adkins v. Staker, 130 Ohio St. 198, 198 N.E. 575 (1935).
26 In Carson v. Beall, 55 Ohio App. 245, 9 N.E.2d 729 (1937), the court of
appeals interpreted Adkins v. Staker as applying only to the judicial proceedings
not the administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court in State ex rel Michaels v.
Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599, 138 N.E.2d 660 (1956) rendered a per curiam opinion
in which the court affirmed an appellate court decision and incorporated the
opinion of the appellate court which included an interpretation of the maximum
legal fee provision as applicable only to judicial proceedings.
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Compensation in Case of Injury or Death:
Section 4123.54
To the language granting benefits to workers injured or killed is
added the phrase to include every employee "who contracts an occupa-
tional disease." This language appears to be surplusage. Sec. 4123.68
provides in detail for occupational disease benefits. Indirectly, however,
the words do have significance. In the section on appeals to the com-
mon pleas court (Sec. 4123.519) the right to appeal is granted only to per-
sons injured. If the legislature had intended to allow appeals in occupa-
tional disease cases it would have inserted a similar phrase in the appeals
section."
Compensation and Benefits
Section 4123.55
Compensation for the first week of total disability is now to be paid if
the worker is totally disabled for a continuous period of three weeks or
more, instead of five weeks.
Sec. 4123.56. The maximum and minimum temporary total dis-
ability payments have been raised from $40.25 and $14.00 to $49.00
and $25.00. The overall maximum allowed for such benefits is also
increased to $10,500 from $8,000.
Sec. 4123.57. Extensive changes were made in partial disability
benefits-temporary or permanent. The weekly maximum is raised to
$49.00 and the overall maximum to $10,000.
The determination of permanent partial disability under paragraph
B has also been altered. Previously, forty weeks had to pass after the
latest period of disability before the disability could be determined. Under
the new law, subsequent total disability will not delay the permanent
partial determination. The commission is required to hear these cases
but there appears to be no requirement that the commission must make
an award if it develops at the hearing the employee is again totally dis-
abled or still recuperating. New criteria for determining permanent par-
tial awards are added to the former criterion of physical disability. Now,
impairment of earning capacity and vocational handicap of the employee
must also be considered. The paragraph B award is based upon a per-
centage of 200 weeks at $49.00 per week which product represents
the whole body. Once made, the whole award is payable as of the date
of the last compensation payment, or if no such payment has been made,
the date of injury. Since 1955 such awards were paid in weekly install-
ments. Now the pre-1955 practice has been reinstated. The claimant
will also be able to change his election to receive compensation under
paragraph A or B, if the commission approves, when good cause has
been shown. Also unpaid installments of awards may now be paid to
27 Similar insertions covering occupational diseases were made in OHIO REV.
CODE §§ 4123.55, .57, .60, .66, .74.
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dependents other than 'the widow or children as the commission de-
termines when the widow and children do not survive.
Schedule benefits under paragraph C were also changed slightly. Loss
of the great 'toe up to the interphalangeal joint is equal to the loss of one-
half of the great toe. Loss beyond this joint is equal to loss of the whole
toe. Loss of vision is to be based on uncorrected vision which is consistent
with previously published commission rules. Maximum payment for facial
disfigurement is increased from $3,750 to $5,000; the commission is re-
quired to make an award for serious facial or head disfigurement which
impairs or may in the future impair employment opportunities. Gainful
employment of the claimant at the time of the commission's determina-
tion is immaterial.
Where severance of a body member has occurred and death ensued
from other causes, awards made and paid before only to the widow and
children may now be paid to other dependents if the widow and chil-
dren do not survive, as the commission determines.
Sec. 4123.571. Procedural and remedial rights of claims accru-
ing before the effective date will be governed by the new law.
Sec. 4123.58. In addition to raising 'the maximum weekly pay-
ments for permanent total disability to $49.00, the General Assembly
removed the frima facie presumption that loss of both hands, arms,
feet, legs, eyes or any two constitutes total and permanent disability.
Such loss is now conclusively such disability.
Sec. 4123.59. Death benefits are increased to $15,000 maximum
for dependents where no widow or children survive. Where total de-
pendency exists the maximum is $18,000 (surviving widow $15,000 and
each child $1,000 up to three children). Payment is made at $49.00
per week. If the average weekly wage is such that $49.00 is not due, a
lesser amount is awarded but never less than $40.25 regardless of the
wage. Previously death benefits have been diminished by the amount of
compensation paid to the decedent during life. Benefits were also paid
only for eight years after injury. Where the death was found to be com-
pensable and either or both limitations indicated no award or a minimal
award, $4,000 was paid as a minimum. After November 2, 1959, both
the limitations on death benefits are eliminated and dependents will re-
ceive the full award. Also now a wife not living with the worker when
he dies "because of the aggression of the husband" will be a dependent.
The surviving parents' minimum award will be $3,000 and the total
award for prospective dependency will be the same. Both were $1,000
before.
The courts have long recognized that benefits are determined as of
the date of death. Therefore, this section will govern in all cases where
death occurs on or after November 2, 1959, regardless of the date of
injury.
Sec. 4123.60. If a decedent would have been entitled to apply
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for an award at the time of his death, application must be made within
one year after death instead of the previous six month period.
Sec. 4123.64. Lump sum payment of an award must now have
the purpose of either rendering financial relief or furthering rehabilita-
tion of the disabled worker.
Free Choice of Physician:
Section 4123.651
For a long period self-insuring employers have been granted the
opportunity to serve the medical needs of their employees injured or dis-
abled within the compensation area. Upon a finding by the commission,
after the employee's application, that the services were inadequate, unfit
or not in the worker's interest, the commission selected at least three
physicians or surgeons and the employee could select one of them. The
new amendment grants free choice of medical services to the worker,
subject only to the commission's approval as to the amount of the bill.
Miscellaneous Benefits:
Section 4123.66
Funeral expenses to be compensated will be increased to $500 and
reimbursement will be made to anyone who pays such expense. When
damage to artificial teeth or dentures and eyeglasses require replacement,
repair or adjustment, the reasonable cost will be paid.
Occupational Disease:
Section 4123.68
The schedule of these diseases now will include radiation illness pay-
able only when death or disability occurs within eight years from the in-
jurious exposure. Disability claims must be filed within one year after
disability begins or if beyond one year, at least six months after diagnosis.
Silicosis referees are abolished. The commission, however, before
awarding compensation must refer the silicosis claim to a "qualified medi-
cal specialist."
Under Sec. 4123.57 (D) the award payable to a silicotic who
changes occupation is increased to $49.00 maximum per week for the first
30 weeks and to $40.25 maximum for the next 75 weeks. This amend-
ment also restricts benefits payable, for today a silicotic can change his
occupation, file within three months for an award, and if it is found that
the change was advisable within the requirements of the statute, an award
is retroactively made. As amended, the silicotic can expect no award ex-
cept where he changes his occupation after his application for permission
has been filed, processed and decided.
Property Lien on Non-Complying Employer:
Section 4123.78
The Administrator and Advisory Council recommended that a lien
against the personal as well as real property of non-complying employers
1959]
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should be provided. The legislature responded, and now the county re-
corder will accept and file the commission's certificate of the amount of
premium due as a real estate mortgage or chattel mortgage.
Statute of Limitations:
Sections 4123.84 and .85
The statute has been amended so that it will be stayed if any benefits
or compensation are furnished or paid. State fund employers will be un-
affected but self-insurers will be greatly affected. Medical treatment is
now defined as a benefit so the statute will now run for two years
after the simplest medical treatment. In occupational disease and death
cases the statute is extended from six months to two years. A longer
period is granted if it does not extend beyond six months after the diag-
nosis of such disease or death by a physician, or if it is within six months
after the claimant is informed of the diagnosis or within two years after
death occurs.
Miscellaneous Deletions:
Substitute H. B. 470 Section 2
Sec. 4123.10. The requirement that no compensation be paid in a
disputed occupational disease case unless a medical advisor or the com-
mission determines the existence of the disease and the time, place and
cause of its inception plus the requirement of an autopsy in an occupa-
tional disease death claim are deleted.
Sec. 4123.15 and .151. Medical advisory boards are eliminated.
The Commission:
Sections 4121.02 and .05
The annual salary of each commissioner will be $12,000 and one
commissioner shall be a person who can be classed as a representative of
the public because of his previous vocation, employment or affiliation.
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